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In many countries, Banking Authorities have adopted an Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) procedure to manage complaints that customers and financial 
intermediaries cannot solve by themselves. As a consequence, banks have had to 
implement complaint management systems in order to deal with customers’ demands. 
The growth rate of customer complaints has been increasing during the last few 
years. This does not seem to be only related to the quality of financial services or to 
lack of compliance in banking products. Another reason lies in the characteristics of 
the procedures themselves, which are very simple and free of charge.  
The paper analyzes some determinants regarding the willingness to complain. In 
particular, it examines whether a high customers’ probability of default leads to an 
increase in non-valid complaints. 
The paper uses a sample of approximately 1,000 customers who received a loan 
and made a claim against the lender. The analysis shows that customers with higher 
Probability of Default are more likely to make claims against Financial Institutions. 
Moreover, it shows that opportunistic behaviors and non-valid complaints are more 
likely if the customer is supported by a lawyer or other professionals and if the reason 
for the claim may result in a refund or damage compensation. 
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Today, banks are quite aware that the global financial crisis has had a negative 
impact on consumer trust in financial intermediaries. In the present scenario, 
successful companies gain competitive advantage through increased efficiency, high 
quality of service and improved customer relationship. 
Several arguments are currently encouraging banks to increasingly adopt 
strategies of customer retention and customer loyalty, and these are based on a very 
simple fact: the costs involved in avoiding the loss of old customers are clearly much 
lower than those necessary to acquire new customers. Moreover, keeping customers 
satisfied is currently really critical and important, since losing a customer in one 
business may also mean losing him/her in other business areas. 
Regarding service quality in particular, banks’ stakeholders are improving their 
attention to the real value of financial products and services and their delivery 
processes, as a parameter for the sustainability of trust-based relationships between 
banks and their customers. 
The issue of the transparency and fairness standards of financial intermediaries 
and that of trust-based customer relationships are of great significance. Banking 
initiatives must ensure the correct progress of the dynamic of contractual balances, in 
which any conduct based on the abuse of dominant positions by strong counterparts 
must be avoided. Within banking contracts there is a natural imbalance between the 
two parties. The customer, the weaker counterpart, is in a position of sharp 
disadvantage compared to the bank. 
In addition, the existence of a quick, direct procedure for communicating and 
managing any dissatisfaction or disservice is a way of protecting the consumer. In fact, 
the customer may not be able to apply to civil justice due to cost reasons and complex 
procedures. On the one hand, this may lead to difficulties in ensuring consumer rights, 
and on the other hand it can cause unfair lender behaviors. 
As a consequence, in many developed countries banks have adopted complaint 
management systems in order to provide instruments to protect the weaker 
counterpart, namely the customer. 
For this reason, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) systems have become a 
topical issue in the attempt to make it easier for the consumer to access justice. These 
systems have developed extensively in the financial services sector and are viewed as a 
cheap way to manage dispute resolution in consumer matters.  
The presence of an effective dispute resolution mechanism gives financial 
intermediaries an incentive to act in accordance with principles of transparency and 
fairness in customer relations, and it enhances the public’s trust in intermediaries; 
moreover, it helps the monitoring of operational, legal and reputational risks. 




complaint management as a mechanism useful for customer retention and for 
improving the quality of the services provided. 
Similarly, many academic studies (regulatory and banking stream of literature) 
investigate the consequences of ADR decisions on customer behavior or the 
interactions between regulation and individual behavior. 
Our study aims to challenge the knowledge and understanding of banking 
complaints by changing the usual perspective of current academic research regarding 
this process. We analyze customer behavior at the first stage, when he/she interacts 
directly with the bank or the financial intermediary before resorting to ADR 
mechanisms (procedures). 
The growth rate of customer complaints is increasing, and they have doubled in 
the last two years. This does not seem to be only related to the quality of financial 
services or the lack of compliance of banking output. One reason may be the 
characteristics of the procedures themselves, since they are very simple and free of 
charge (without any sanctions, costs or penalties for incorrect use or behavior). 
Moreover, the ADR mechanism has important implications for the bank, because all 
procedures are monitored by the Banking Authorities. 
The initial idea for the paper regards the simplicity of these procedures and the 
absence of costs and negative consequences for customers. This may have encouraged 
their use in order to obtain benefits from the bank, to reduce penalties for 
misbehaviors or, even, to avoid obligations due to the bank. 
We try to explore some determinants of willingness to complain.  
The research question is the following: does unwillingness to repay or difficulties 
in returning the loan, or unethical conduct, lead to an increase in complaints and, in 
particular, an increase in non-valid complaints? 
The main hypothesis is that current literature may have assigned a crucial role to 
complaint schemes, namely, complaint handlers’ management of complainants’ 
expectations for redress. We believe that it would also be useful to understand 
whether the abnormally high increase in the rate of complaints should be viewed only 
in relation to the quality of banking services or lack of attention to compliance, or if 
there is room for other, opportunistic behaviors. 
The paper analyses a sample of approximately 1,000 customers who received a 
loan and made a claim against the lender. The analysis shows that it is indeed 
customers with a high Probability of Default who are more likely to make claims 
against the financial institution. Moreover, it shows that opportunistic behaviors and 
non-valid complaints are more likely if the customer is supported by a lawyer or other 
professionals and if the reason for the claim may result in a refund or damage 
compensation. 
Policy implications are quite significant, as they suggest that authorities need to  
review these mechanisms, since they may give rise to opportunistic behaviors by 





The paper is structured as follows.  
Section 1, the introduction, briefly introduces the topic and explains the structure 
of the study. Section 2 describes the process by which banks manage  complaints 
through the different existing  steps and the main features of the Italian ADR system 
(Banking and Financial Ombudsman or Banking Financial Arbitrator, BFA), and provides 
statistical information on the appeals submitted to the BFA and complaints received by 
financial institutions regarding consumer credit. In Section 3 we review the main 
research literature strands on the topic. Section 4 describes the methodology adopted 
and the data set used to carry out the empirical analysis performed on complaints and 
presents the results of the analysis. This is followed by some concluding remarks and 
managerial implications in Section 5.  
 
2. Background 
Complaint management systems are related to the process of receiving, 
investigating and resolving disputes arising from customers’ complaints about a 
financial procedure or product.  
Recently the debate on ADRs as instruments that facilitate access to justice has 
become more widespread in the EU, as these mechanisms have proved to be 
particularly useful for consumer-related disputes concerning small monetary claims. 
The low value of the majority of these disputes makes courts often an unsuitable place 
to obtain individual redress. For this reason, courts are seen as the last resort, and, 
when available, consumers increasingly opt for more informal ADR schemes.  
Furthermore, the financial crisis placed a renewed focus on consumer protection, 
resulting in the adoption of new guidelines for complaints management in the financial 
sector4. 
In many developed economies, banking authorities have adopted an Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR) procedure – in Italy the so-called Banking Financial 
Arbitrator, or BFA – in order to manage complaints that customers and financial 
intermediaries cannot resolve by themselves.  
In Italy5, all customers can use this procedure after a first stage in which they 
submit their claims to financial intermediaries or banks through a specific system of 
complaint management6. After 30 days, if they have not received an answer or they 
                                                        
4
 See Bank of Italy (2014) and (2016b). 
5 We need to underline that the main consumer ADR schemes adopted among different countries will not be 
analyzed. See for all Boccuzzi (2010), Valsecchi (2011) and Bank of Italy (2017). 
6 With specific reference to the organization and operation of complaints offices, a recent analysis conducted by 
the Bank of Italy examines good practices and criticalities in handling of complaints. More precisely, the Bank of 
Italy underlines that complaints management guidelines – issued by the Joint EBA-ESMA-EIOPA Committee in 
May 2014 – require the competent authorities to ensure that companies (and banks, ndr) adopt a complaints 





are not satisfied with the bank’s answer, they can apply for a ruling from the BFA or a 
civil  court.  
In 2009 the Bank of Italy instituted the BFA-implementing Article 128-bis of the 
Consolidated Law on Banking, a provision introduced by Law 262/2005 (Investor 
Protection Law). The Investor Protection Law stipulates that the banking and financial 
sectors must have systems in place for the out-of-court settlement of disputes, and the 
law itself states the principles to which these systems should conform: timeliness, 
cost-effectiveness and effective legal protection; a deciding body that is impartial and 
representative; and protection of the legal right to seek remedy through the other 
means made available by the legal system. 
The BFA’s decisions “are not legal judgments: they are not legally binding on the 
customer or the intermediary and they do not affect the possibility of submitting the 
dispute to the civil courts. The relevance of the BFA’s decisions lies in their 
authoritative quality and impartiality. If an intermediary refuses to comply with a 
decision, notice of its non-compliance is published on the BFA’s website”7. 
It is important to underline that the BFA cannot decide on issues related to 
investment products, services and activities (securities trading or placement, 
investment advice, asset management, or matters relating to bonds issued or settled 
by banks). For these issues the Arbitrator of Financial Disputes (AFD), a new out-of-
court dispute resolution body established by Consob, was created in January 2017. 
Participation in the ABF system is mandatory for banks, as a condition for the 
conduct  of banking and financial business. Non-compliance is punishable with a fine. 
All intermediaries are included in the registers kept by the Bank of Italy. Banks, 
finance companies, payment institutions, electronic money institutions, loan 
guarantee consortia and BancoPosta must join the system, as must foreign 
intermediaries operating in Italy which are not part of Fin-Net, the European out-of-
court settlement system endorsed by the European Commission8. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
manage complaints in a fair way. 
Procedures should include the identification of a manager and/or an office independent from business functions. 
The compliance – or in its absence the Internal Audit – function must report to the corporate bodies about the 
overall situation of the complaints received and about the adequacy of the procedures and organizational solutions 
in place at least annually. 
During 2015, inspections were carried out on the operations of complaints offices. The audits identified a number 
of good organizational practices capable of providing quick, exhaustive, satisfactory customer responses, as well as 
effective use of information obtained from complaints; in some cases, the controls highlighted the existence of 
areas for improvement. The Bank of Italy therefore sent a communication to illustrate good practices throughout 
the banking and financial system, asking each operator to conduct an in-depth examination of its handling of 
complaints and to take initiatives aimed at raising the quality of the service. See for detail Bank of Italy (2016a). 
7 
“The BFA must not be confused with arbitration, a legal instrument whose purpose is to enable parties, under an 
agreement that may precede or follow the occurrence of the dispute, to have their case settled by one or more 
arbiters whose decisions are binding. Nor can the BFA be likened to mediation. The two procedures differ in legal 
basis, scope and prerequisites for access, and the outcomes are also very different”. See Bank of Italy (2014) and 
(2016b). 
8 
Fin-Net is a network promoted by the European Commission  to assist the development and cooperation of ADR 
schemes in Europe. It enables consumers who have a dispute with an intermediary in another member state to turn 





Bank of Italy “checks banks’ compliance with the rules on transparency and 
fairness with off-site prudential controls and on-site inspections at branches and 
headquarters. In the case of irregularities, anomalies or misconduct, the Bank 
intervenes and takes appropriate measures with respect to the system or individual 
banks, depending on the seriousness of the issues”9. 
The outcomes of the BFA’s proceedings constitute a significant contribution to 
supervisory activity: the BFA’s decisions “become part of the broader pool of 
information at the Bank’s disposal for its regulatory and control function”10.  
Intermediaries are under no obligation, in their customer relations, to follow every 
interpretation made or endorsed by the BFA. Nevertheless, pursuant to its Directives, 
banks and other financial intermediaries “must ensure, through appropriate internal 
procedures, that their complaints departments are familiar with the BFA’s guidelines, 
are updated to the most recent positions and assess customer complaints on this 
basis. In particular, the complaints departments are required to determine whether 
the point raised by the customer has a precedent in earlier cases decided by the 
panels”11. 
Figure 1 describes the steps of the process and the mandatory duties in term of 
disclosures involved.  
Figure 1 – The steps of the complaint handling process in Italy 
                                                                                                                                                                  
the intermediary’s country. Fin-Net currently has 60 member ADR schemes from EU countries plus Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway. Italy’s Banking and Financial Ombudsman has been a member since 2011. See Bank of 
Italy (2017). 
9 See Bank of Italy (2014). 
10
 See Bank of Italy (2016c), Section 1, sub-section 1, par. 5. 





Source: adapted from Bank of Italy (2014).  
A complaint against a bank is first submitted by the complainant to the bank for its 
consideration (‘Step 1’).  
A complainant who is dissatisfied with the bank’s decision may then request its 
review by the BFA (‘Step 2’).  
The BFA’s decisions are legally binding upon firms, whereas consumers are free to 
pursue their case anew in the civil courts (‘Step 3’). They are free to complain to civil 
courts in any moment (i.e. ‘Step 3’ does not necessarily come at the end); in Italy it is 
well known that the standard costs and lengths of legal procedures are not 
competitive compared with ADR systems. 
At the same time, banks publish a report with a qualitative and quantitative 
analysis of all complaints received (aggregated data) during the year, and changes 
from the previous year, on their websites annually. We have called this disclosure 
moment ‘Step 1.5’, even if we know that it does not happen exactly between ‘Step 1’ 
and ‘Step 2’.  
Moreover, every year the Banking Financial Arbitrator publishes a very detailed 
report including data on appeals and operations (matters under dispute, types of 
intermediary, outcomes, etc.). We have called this additional disclosure moment ‘Step 
2.5’ (with the same caveat as above).  




to describe the conceptual framework of our study and its relation to the literature. 
We can already state that most of the literature concerns empirical studies 
performed on data collected from ‘Step 1.5’ and ‘Step 2.5’, especially in terms of 
effects of the BFA’s decisions on customer behavior.  
At present,  we are unaware of any studies regarding what happens at ‘Step 1’, 
due to the lack of publicly available data. 
The following figures offer a breakdown of the appeals submitted to the BFA 
(Tab.1) and the complaints received by financial institutions regarding consumer credit 
(Tab.2). Both trends concern the period from 2013 to 2016. 
Table 1 - Appeals submitted to BFA 
 2016 2015 2014 2013 









N. of BFA appeals yoy (%)  59 21 43  
Decided in favor of complainants (%) 49 41 33 36 
Settled by the parties (%) 25 27 34 34 
Rejected (%) 26 32 33 30 
Appeals presented by lawyers and other 
professionals (%) 61 60 41 28 
Source: Banking and Financial Ombudsman Annual Report (various years) 
Table 1 shows the fast growth in appeals submitted to the BFA. They cover all 
types of banking products and services and almost tripled compared to 2013.  
Another noteworthy phenomenon is the growth of appeals presented by lawyers 
and other professionals, which is a clear sign that the interest is this complaining 
activity comes not only from customers but also from various types of professionals, 
who are obviously acting for profit. 
Table 2 describes complaints received by financial institutions only regarding 
consumer credit. This phenomenon increased significantly and concerns around 0.5% 
of existing loans. The number of accepted complaints increased over the last few 
years. Despite the fact that the original role of the complaints procedure envisaged 
direct contact between financial institutions and customers, during 2016 two-thirds of 
the complaints received were submitted by lawyers and other professionals. 
 
Table 2 - Complaints received by financial institutions regarding consumer credit 
 2016 2015 2014 2013 




N. Complaints/N. Loans 0,53 0,38 0,29 0,23 
Decided in favor of complainant (%) 46 43 34 34 
     
Appeals to BFA (%) 19 12 9 6 
Complaints presented by lawyers and other professionals 
(%) 66 60   
Customers (%) 34 40   
N. of employees (Complaint Office) yoy (%) 1 8 20 19 
Average days for response 17 18 20 17 
Complaints per employee 582 454 358 321 
Source: Assofin, Annual Report on Consumer Credit Complaints (various years)  
It is equally interesting that the number of employees in complaint handling 
offices has increased by more than 50% since 2013, and this has happened in order to 
ensure fast, accurate answers within 30 days (required by law) after receipt of the 
complaint. 
3. Literature review 
3.1. Complaining in managerial and marketing stream 
An increasing interest in consumer complaint behavior (CCB) arose during the 
'60s. At that time consumer satisfaction, dissatisfaction and CCB were three different – 
but at the same time highly correlated – themes investigated by marketing and 
consumer studies. 
These studies originate from real, concrete marketing problems; for example, a 
focus on quality, performance and satisfaction or an emphasis on customers leads 
researchers to inquire into the complex mechanisms which determine customer 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction, and the consequent behaviors. 
At the same time, the studies aim to identify and suggest managerial and practical 
solutions which can be applied to markets or services. 
Consumer complaint behavior is an area of research dealing with identification 
and analysis of all the aspects involved in the consumer’s reaction to a product or 
service failure and the consequent perceived dissatisfaction.  
In fact, CCB consists of the potential responses the customer uses to express his or 
her dissatisfaction. 
More specifically, CCB is people’s behavior in the event of a complaint, and it 




company, the supplier of products and services, or  third-party organizations. Thus, the 
study of CCB seems essential for explaining and predicting the customer’s intention to 
continue the relationship and remain loyal. 
Recognizing the causes and consequences of customer complaint behavior is of 
great importance within the environment of competition among products and 
services, as well as among financial intermediaries.  
Especially for banks, this area is critical for identifying and managing operational, 
legal and reputational risks: a strong focus on customer complaints may reduce these 
kinds of risks. Recent financial crises have shown to what extent reputational risk can 
influence banks’ and financial institutions’ performances. 
Within the managerial and marketing stream of literature, many empirical and 
theoretical studies have analyzed complaints and the importance of different variables 
within customers’ experience of dissatisfaction.  
The absolutely seminal work about the alternatives available to dissatisfied people 
is that of Hirschman (1970), which identifies three possible options: exit, voice and 
loyalty.  
Researchers suggest various taxonomies for understanding the multiple CCB 
responses in which consumers can engage (Singh, 1988; Maute, Forrester, 1993, 
Broadbridge, Marshall, 1995). 
Customers can complain in various ways, by seeking redress, boycotting suppliers, 
telling family and friends about the experience or doing nothing at all (Blodgett et al., 
1995).  
Consumer complaints can be used not only to obtain redress, but also to increase 
a firm’s efficiency. Sellers receive important feedback on their products/services, 
leading to improved and increased consumer satisfaction. In fact, complaints reveal 
problems, which  are significant in many cases (Landon, 1980). 
Complaints can inform firms about consumers’ existing needs and provide the 
opportunity for discussion about future needs. It has been said  that “understanding 
complaints is equivalent to mining gold” (Sanes, 1993).  
From this perspective, the complaining process may help to discover and correct 
product problems, increase consumer satisfaction and retain the consumer as an 
active purchaser, rather than simply comfort consumers or providing an excuse and/or 
fair redress (Hogarth, English, 2002).  
Many studies underline one specific aspect: the major differences depending on 
whether the customer uses a service or buys a product.  
More in detail, consumers seem to experience greater dissatisfaction with services 
compared to products (Best, Andreasen, 1977) and the reasons most frequently 
mentioned seem to be careless and unprofessional approaches. The same authors find 
that complaints are more frequent when the problem is perceived to be objective 
rather than subjective. 
Hirschman (1970) and Tronvoll (2007) stressed the differences in consumer 
behavior according to the market situation. The consumer reaction toward an 




easily available. In a competitive market, the exit solution is easy to implement 
because competitors are known and available. On the contrary, in a monopolistic 
situation the most likely reaction to product or service failure is to remain silently loyal 
or to engage in negative word-of-mouth. 
Various studies have tried to profile customers according to different aspects: age, 
sex, education, income, nationality and personality. However, the findings of a lot of 
studies on this aspect of CCB have shown very limited consistency and low significance. 
Therefore, in the main managerial and marketing-related stream of literature, 
many studies highlight the value of customer complaints and underline the fact that 
these should be welcomed.  
A considerable part of this research assumes that customers do not knowingly 
complain without good reason. In fact, the concentration within the service failure 
literature on service recovery is primarily rooted on the assumption that services have 
genuinely failed and reasons which drive customers’ complaints are essentially 
legitimate. 
Conversely, research has paid very little attention to the behaviors (and hidden 
reasons) of those consumers who knowingly voice ‘fake complaints’, which represent 
the dishonest and unjustified side of CCB.  
In  contrast to the main body of managerial and marketing stream of literature 
(where customers’ complaints originate from true dissatisfaction), referred to above, 
this much smaller area of the literature explains that complaint episodes may occur 
without customers experiencing real service failure or dissatisfaction. 
Jacoby, Jaccard (1981) acknowledge the existence of complaints from “satisfied 
users” who may “deliberately fabricate” problems. 
Reynolds, Harris (2005) explore the reasons and forms of deliberately illegitimate 
complaints, involving the  reporting of non-existent service failures. Using critical 
incident technique they analyzed 104 interviews with customers who had knowingly 
made an illegitimate complaint six months prior to the interview. Interesting insights 
and four distinct forms of customer complainants emerged from their study. They 
labelled them as follows: one-off complainants, opportunistic complainants, 
conditioned complainants, and professional complainants. 
Ro, Wong (2012) investigate how service employees handle opportunistic 
customer complaints in hotels and restaurants. 
Huang, Miao (2016) explore frontline employees’ perceptions and answers given 
to illegitimate customer complaining behavior in the hospitality business. In this study, 
the data analysis again revealed different types of illegitimate complainants: 
opportunistic plotters, repetitive grumblers, and occasional tyrants.  
Legitimate complaining customers may also become opportunistic complainants 
by gaining advantage of the service failure in order to obtain extra financial benefits 
when complaining (Wirtz, McColl-Kennedy, 2010).  
These are only some of the studies related to this specific yet important approach.  
All these studies contradict the mantra that "the customer is always right", which 




For our research question this stream is a key point within the literature.  
 
3.2. Complaining in the financial sector 
In the financial sector, services and products are very similar, and even when there 
are innovations they are quite easy to copy. Hence, when it comes to supplying 
services and products, banks can differentiate themselves only in terms of price and 
quality. In this industry satisfaction becomes a key variable, allowing differentiation 
from competitors.  
Complaint management is a relatively recent research field, which is integrated 
within the larger area of customer relationship management. 
It is well known that the scenario in which the financial institutions operate has 
altered in recent years. With  the increased competition, global market, growing 
product portfolio and diminishing margins, banking customer behavior has also 
changed.  
Customer dissatisfaction is often affected by the relationship established with 
front office human resources. The main reasons for consumer complaint behavior in 
banks are rude behavior by staff, delay in service, hidden costs, long queues and wrong 
information. The psychological aspect that influences the relationship between the 
bank’s employees on one side and customers on the other is analyzed in Khartabiel, 
Saydam (2014). Many factors are considered in the study: banking functions, training 
programs, wages, communication related to bank organization, team work, job 
satisfaction, careers opportunities, customer loyalty and provision of high quality 
services to customers that fit their needs. The authors found that when banks act to 
improve job satisfaction, they simultaneously raise customer satisfaction and loyalty. 
In other words, employment satisfaction reflects significantly on employees’ behavior 
towards costumers, and this strengthens the important hypothesis that satisfied 
employees produce better results. 
Moving from the consequences to the antecedent causes of service quality, the 
academic literature regarding banks and financial institutions converges on the 
importance of behavioral and process indicators, such as attentiveness, 
responsiveness, care, and assurance, as the main influencing variables of banking 
service quality (Bloemer et al. 1998). These variables can be measured through 
customer satisfaction analysis and loyalty indicators, as well as complaint handling 
systems. 
Other authors (Wang et al, 2003) demonstrate that in the banking industry, the 
higher the quality of service perceived by the customer, the lower the reputational risk 
exposure and, conversely, the lower the customer’s perception of quality of service, 
the higher the reputational risk exposure. 
The paradox of complaint management lies in the hypothesis according to which, 
following a negative event, a dissatisfied customer may be more satisfied and more 
loyal than a customer who did not experience this event, provided that the firm 




than positive interactions. Lok and Matthews (2007) found that satisfactory resolution 
of a complaint makes customers happier and less likely to leave the bank. 
In the event of a complaint, the bank may reduce losses and accordingly the risk of 
losing the customer by referring the problem to its own customer care department. If 
the department is able to provide a reasonable solution for the customer, the bank 
may reduce losses and the customer will be entitled to a refund for the loss suffered 
(Uppal, 2010). 
Complaint management is a very crucial tool for enhancing customer loyalty, risk 
minimization and CRM (Shalini, Munjal, 2014). These authors found a significant 
relationship between complaints and risk, and that complaint management is a means 
of reducing risk. 
In order to gain a competitive advantage from complaint management, the 
organizational structure must have an efficient system for doing this (Hakiri, 2012). If 
the bank makes an effort to solve the problem promptly and attempts to identify the 
origin of the issue perceived by the customer, with the information being properly filed 
and stored, the bank is able to improve the quality of the service supplied. 
Unpleasant banking experiences have also been investigated (generally through 
surveys and questionnaires) in different national banking systems in order to find the 
determinants of complaining; poor and unsatisfactory employee behavior determines 
unpleasant customer experiences. Wrong answers from banking staff in general lead 
to an increase in unpleasant customer experiences (Jugenissova et al., 2014).  
One of the crucial drivers of unpleasant experiences is the time spent during the 
provision of banking services (Srijumpa et al., 2007).  
Another interesting result, even if on a qualitative basis and concerning the 
Chilean banking industry, comes from Valenzuela (2006), who reveals that customers 
expect different types of reactions from their banks depending on the stage of the 
complaint process; moreover, it is useful to constantly inform the customer of the 
progress of his/her complaint. 
Ramachandran, Chidambaram (2012) provide an almost complete review of the 
literature on these themes; they summarize the findings of the literature on customer 
satisfaction with a bank’s services from five different perspectives: service encounters; 
customer waiting time to access the service; role of intermediaries; quality of service 
provided; and customer complaints to the bank. They state that an organization’s 
service process performance should be measured continuously in order to achieve 
competitive advantage, which can be gained by providing excellent service.  
There are very few studies on the Italian banking sector, especially when we shift 
to analyses  using a real complaint database.  
One reason (but not the only one) for this is that since 2010 the Bank of Italy has 
legally forced banks to  publish a report regarding their complaints management 
activities on their website. This mandatory disclosure concerns not only the  number of 
complaints, but also the type of services or products which generated them (‘Step 
1.5’). 




against Italian retail banks. They use the complaints data referred to above, available 
on all bank websites. Their study aims to define the behavior of different types of 
banks (by legal form, size, etc.). The underlying hypothesis of their paper is that the 
number of complaints incurred by a bank is a good proxy for customer dissatisfaction. 
The larger the banks and the number of services they offer, the higher the number of 
complaints they receive; in order to avoid scale problems (i.e. when comparing big and 
small banks), the total number of complaints was divided with appropriate scale 
variables. The study examines year 2011 and considers more than 66,500 complaints 
concerning 47 Italian banks, covering about 60% of transactions on the Italian banking 
market. From their initial results, conducted with three analysis of variance (Anova) 
tests, it emerges that small banks and local banks are better able to prevent retail 
customer dissatisfaction. 
D’Apolito, Sylos Labini (2014) analyze the level of disclosure in handling complaints 
in a sample of Italian banks. The research covers the period 2010-2012. They measured  
disclosure by means of the information provided by banks  on their websites and in 
corporate documents and estimated the relationship between this level of disclosure 
and financial and organizational variables. Their results reveal several findings:  
✓ the level of disclosure increased both qualitatively and quantitatively during the 
three-year period, although with differences among banks;  
✓ this level of disclosure at that time was still low;  
✓ size and efficiency variables were significant, as well as the internal 
organizational arrangements for handling complaints – in-house management vs. 
outsourcing. 
We could continue to analyze other studies, but most research within the financial 
sector covers and deals with the main stream, in a way quite similar to that previously 
described.  
Albeit with different depths, these studies – of which only few are cited, for the 
sake of brevity – indicate that banks pursue a duality of interests: the preservation of 
future customer-related benefits  and the improvement of the quality of their services. 
Therefore this literature provides a common framework that is, almost always, related 
to the topic of dissatisfaction. Briefly speaking, the main key messages are: 
✓ complaints are a clear expression of dissatisfaction; for this reason careful 
analysis of complaints – which are very rich information sources – allows banks 
to detect situations of customer dissatisfaction and the reasons for them; 
✓ complaints are key indicators, useful for measuring the real performance level of 
the customer service; 
✓ complaints management is a good way of enhancing the quality perceived by 
customers and the relationship with them; 
✓ efficient complaints management systems should allow banks to limit legal and 
reputation risks through the reduction of conflict with customers and, as a 




3.3. Complaining and ADR schemes 
Most of the interest in ADR around the world arises from the undeniable fact that 
civil courts are overloaded, and legal costs are very high. 
The literature on ADR can be divided into three main clusters: 
1. studies that are regulatory analyses of the main features of different ADR systems; 
many of the studies we examined concern the Italian Banking Financial Arbitrator, 
BFA (Bank of Italy, 2014, 2016b, 2016c, 2017; Caggiano, 2015, Consolo, Stella, 
2011; De Carolis, 2011; Frosini, 2011; Maimeri, 2012; Perassi, 2011); 
2. studies that are comparative analyses of ADR schemes in various countries; the 
comparison of consumer ADR schemes shows a wide range of different 
approaches, including arbitration, ombudsmen, mediation and conciliation 
schemes and also various determinants related to the decision to refer to the ADR 
procedure instead of civil courts (Boccuzzi, 2010; Valsecchi, 2011; Gilad, 2008a, 
2008b; Thomas, Frizon, 2011); 
3. studies that are empirical analyses of the nature of and trend in appeals to the BFA 
in terms of types and/or correlation with other aspects, such as the effects of 
disclosure of verdicts on the frequency of new complaints (Malinconico et al., 
2011; Malinconico, Fuccio, 2016; Filotto et al., 2016). 
For this paper, we are mainly interested in the third cluster of studies, which 
provides empirical analysis based on the statistics on bank disputes in retail banking 
service, in order to assess to what extent ADR has been used by financial consumers, 
and the consequent effects on banks’ behavior towards clients. 
Malinconico et al. (2011) focus specifically on the effect of ADR systems on the 
protection of customers. They provide an exploratory analysis (referring to 2009 –
2010) intended to identify the preliminary features of ADR in Italy, in order to assess to 
what extent this opportunity has been used by Italian financial consumers, and the 
effects produced on banks’ behavior towards clients.  
The assumption that complaints are an expression of negative customer 
sentiment and that the way complaints are managed influences the customer’s 
perception of the quality of services has been studied by Malinconico, Fuccio (2016), 
who treat the number of appeals to the BFA as a reliable indicator of deep 
dissatisfaction deriving  not only from the poor quality of the services provided, but 
also from the speed with which the bank is able to manage customers’ complaints. 
Data used refers to years 2012-2014 and concerns appeals filed with the BFA relating 
to a sample of 74 Italian banks. Results show that small banks and cooperative banks 
are presumably more inclined to monitor their customers closely, also due to the fact 
that their organizational structures enable them to solve customer problems. 
In a particularly interesting study, Filotto et al. (2016) examine the behaviors of 
consumers appealing to the BFA (our ‘Step 2’) in order to attempt to identify any effect 
of "attracting" other complaints (our ‘Step 1’), obviously at a later time. They started 
from the hypothesis that, if rulings in certain types of case are mostly in the appellants’ 
favor, this encourages consumers to lodge complaints, since the very low cost of the 




between the number of new complaints submitted and the number of valid claims. 
Their main results show that for many banking products a sort of "attraction effect” 
does exist, and  is almost immediate, as it occurs within a two-year period. Considering 
that the BFA’s decisions are publicly disclosed, but still not widely well known to the 
general public, it is difficult to understand how such a large number of consumers can 
become aware of these outcomes and decide to complain. One possibly reasonable 
answer is that lawyers and professionals (the so-called facilitators) are now playing a 
significant role in looking for potential appellants, who are encouraged to submit a 
complaint to the BFA.  
Recent data, collected and analyzed in Section 2, further confirms this trend  and, 
consequently, this explanation. 
4. Methodology and analysis 
4.1. The sample 
Data used in the analysis refers to about a thousand of complaints related to 
consumer credit products submitted by customers during 2015 and 2016. It represents 
the total number of complaints received by a financial intermediary which is controlled 
by a banking group, and operates nationwide only in consumer credit.  
 
Table 3 – Number of complaints  





The valid complaints are about 9.7% of the sample9 (Table 3). Their distribution is 
fairly similar across the geographical areas considered by the BFA (Table 4). 
 
Table 4 – Complaints by geographical distribution  
Area Valid Non-Valid Total  In % 
Southern Italy 38% 35% 35% 35,3% 
Central Italy 30% 34% 33% 33,3% 
Northern Italy 32% 31% 31% 31,4% 





The  complaints made directly by consumers (Table 5) are equal to 56% of the 
sample, The complaints made through law firms, other professionals and consumer 
associations  represent the 44% of the sample (Table 5). 
 
Table 5 – Complaints by origin 
Origin Valid Non-Valid Total  In % 
Individual consumer 68% 55% 56% 56% 
Consumer Association 3% 9% 8% 8% 
Law firms 29% 36% 36% 36% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
14% of complaints relate to staff behavior, misleading customer information, or 
other aspects of interaction between the financial intermediary and the customer, 
while the remaining 86% relate to aspects like contract fulfilment, the fees and charges 
levied, reporting to Credit Register, etc. (Table 6). 
 
Table 6 - Kind of complaint 
Kind of complaint Valid Non-Valid Total  In % 
Other 38% 8% 11% 11% 
Behavioural 2% 3% 3% 3% 
Procedural 60% 89% 86% 86% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
4.2. The variables 
Our dependent variable is the validity of each complaint. It is a dichotomous 
variable, which assumes value 1 when the complaint is valid and value 0 in the 
opposite case (non-valid). 
The complaints’ validity was initially assessed by the financial institution and this 
was then verified by the authors. 
All valid complaints are considered accepted by the financial institution. In some 
cases, non-valid complaints are also accepted by the financial institution, for 
relationship reasons. 
The independent and explanatory variables considered in the model relate to the 




 Kind of complaint (KIND) is a variable with a range 1-3, and it describes the type of 
complaint. Value 1 refers to customer interaction complaint, value 2 refers to 
complaints related to employees’ behavior, and value 3 to complaints related to 
correct fulfilment of the contract. 
 Reason for complaint (REASON) is a variable with a range 1-5, and it describes the 
reason for the complaint. Value 1 represents errors, delays and changes in the 
contract, value 2 identifies reasons relating to the financial institution’s 
organization and the behavior of its staff, value 3 refers to reporting to Credit 
Registers, value 4 relates to credit assessments and fulfilment of the contract, and 
value 5 refers to the application of the fees and charges. 
 Product (PRODUCT) is a variable with a range 1-5, and describes the type of 
product (from the most relational to the less relational). Value 1 identifies 
personal loans, value 2 loans for purchases of motor vehicles, value 3 credit cards, 
value 4 loans secured by a pledge of  one-fifth of the borrower’s salary (LFS) and 
value 5 financing of purchases by instalment credit. 
 Probability of default (PD) is a variable with a range 0-1 that provides an estimate 
of the likelihood that a consumer will be unable to meet his or her debt 
obligations. It is calculated at the time of the lender’s  decision.  
 Originator (ORIGINATOR) is a variable with a range 1-3, and it describes the 
complaint’s originator: value 1 identifies individual consumers, value 2 identifies 
professionals or consumer associations and value 3 identifies lawyers.  
 Area (AREA) is a variable that describes the consumer’s geographical area. The 
areas are based on the territorial jurisdiction of the BFA panels, located in Milan, 
Rome and Naples. The range is 1-3 where value 1 is the Northern area, value 2 is 
the Central area and value 3 is the Southern area. 
 Processing time (TIME) is a variable that specifies the number of days needed to 
process the customer’s complaint. 
4.3. The model 
The econometric analysis was performed using a probit model where the 
dependent variable is VALIDITY, and the independent variables are selected among the 
variables described in the previous subsection.  
The model 1 considers the credit risk measurement assessed at the time when the 
loan request is accepted. The variable that measures credit risk at the time of 
acceptance of the loan request is PD, which is an ex-ante measure of risk. In this model 
we consistently avoided  including the OVERRIDE variable, because it is reasonably 
correlated with PD. 
Results are presented in Table 7. 
Table 7 – A probit analysis of validity of complaints: Dependent Variable VALIDITY 




(Intercept) 0.16  
 (0.30)  
Tipo (KIND) −1.03 ***  
 (0.16)  
Abi1 (REASON) −0.14*  
 (0.08)  
PD −2.08**  
 (0.95)  
Proven 
(ORIGINATOR) −0.19**  
 (0.09)  
Area (AREA) 0.09  
 (0.09)  
Processing time 
(TIME) 0.01  
 (0.01)  
AIC 447.14  
BIC 479.50  
Log Likelihood -216.57  
Deviance 433.14  
Num. obs. 753  
Notes : Probit regression. Significance Levels ***p<0.01, ** p< 0.05, *p < 0.1 
 
 
4.4. The results 
The Probit analysis shows that there is a significant and negative relationship 
between the consumer's riskiness and the complaint’s validity. This correlation 
confirms that the likelihood of filing unjustified and non-valid claims increases as the 
customer’s credit risk increases. 




kind of complaint (KIND) and validity. Complaints related to contracts’ fulfilment are 
less likely to be valid than those that arise from organizational issues and staff 
behavior.  
The variable related to the reason for the complaint (REASON) is significant and 
shows an inverse correlation with complaint’s validity. It should be noted that 
complaints regarding the application of economic conditions normally require a refund 
claim and, in many cases, also compensation for damages. Obviously, these complaints 
increase the likelihood of opportunistic behaviors by clients and lawyers and other 
professionals who assist them, and this clearly increases the attempts to obtain  
redress from financial institutions. 
Moreover,  the PROVEN variable also highlights an inverse and significant 
relationship with the complaint’s validity. The presence of a lawyer or other 
practitioner increases the likelihood of submitting non-valid claims. This is contrary to 
what would have been expected, as the presence of a professional – given the greater 
financial and legal expertise – should have reduced the likelihood that their clients 
would make inappropriate claims. At the same time, this result confirms the findings of 
Filotto et al. (2016): “the so-called facilitators are acting for profit, gaining interest not 
only from lenders but also from consumers and that their misdeeds contaminate and 
distort the ABF's activity forcing it to work on serial complaints and undermining its 
original role of a free access judicial service”. 
We tested also two more variables. The AREA variable, which identifies the 
geographical provenience of the complaint from the different areas of competence of 
the FBA panels, is not significant, and nor is the TIME variable (related to the 
processing time of each complaint).  
These results largely confirm our initial hypothesis: a high probability of Default 
leads to an increase in complaints and, in particular, in non-valid complaints. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The parallel analysis carried out both on the specific features of the complaint and 
on the credit profile of the customers who submitted it highlights some relevant 
phenomena. These are interesting both from a marketing and relationship 
management point of view, and, above all, for regulatory and consumer protection 
profile reasons. 
The behavior of clients and, similarly, the behavior of professionals and lawyers 
assisting them, appears to be basically opportunistic. The riskier a customer , the 
greater the likelihood of claims against the financial institution. In particular, it is 
evident that non-valid claims are most likely to relate to reasons which may generate 
entitlement  to a refund or compensation. 
A system that has been created and introduced in order to protect the consumer, 
the weak counterpart, is gradually changing into an area of litigation between the 




behaviors, on the part of both customers and the professionals who assist them. 
Naturally, an assessment of relationship quality based on accepted and rejected 
claims could be distorted by a bias deriving from the use of complaint validity decisions 
made by the bank itself. However, it must also remembered that there are significant 
factors discouraging intermediaries from behaving in an opportunistic manner when 
assessing complaints. The existence of a quick, direct procedure enabling customers to 
appeal in case of dissatisfaction or poor service, through recourse to the ABF, is a 
strong disincentive to malpractice on the part of intermediaries. It is in the interests of 
financial intermediaries or banks to manage complaints properly, in order to mitigate 
legal and reputational risks, avoid increased operating costs generated by the 
management of appeals and reduce the number of ABF rulings against them. Equally 
important are the effects on possible actions by the supervisory authorities to identify 
the causes of frequent appeals and incorrectly handled complaints and, last but not 
least, the intermediaries' interest in safeguarding customer relationships which, as we 
have seen, can be strengthened by the correct management of criticalities and 
complaints. 
This study represents the first attempt to describe opportunistic behaviors on the 
part of bank customers when making complaints, and it helps to fill the current gap in 
complaining banking literature.  
The results obtained from the study were expected to help banks to take the 
actions necessary to improve their quality of service  and achieve good results in terms 
of customer satisfaction.  
In actual fact, these results will help banks to strengthen and enforce their 
complaint departments, to deal with  the fact that, in many cases, claims are virtually a 
form of attempted fraud  against lenders. 
Managerial implications highlighted by the study include a need for banks’ 
management to customer complaints more effectively. Managers have to enforce 
mechanisms by which customer complaints are monitored and tracked in order to 
identify and challenge fraudulent complainers. 
Policy implications are quite significant, as they suggest that the authorities should 
review these mechanisms, since they can cause opportunistic behaviors on the part of 
consumers, consulting firms, law firms and associations for business and profit 
reasons.  
Credit authorities should consider and introduce appropriate mechanisms to steer 
customers towards fair and honest behaviors, as well as penalties and disincentives  to 
make unfair and unjustified claim attempts very expensive. 
The increase in costs and operational risks for lenders is significant and could lead 
to an increase in average credit costs or, even worse, a reduction in the supply of 
credit, especially for those products that are characterized by more regulatory 
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